Boethius: A Roman Pragmatist
In class, I think we accurately distinguished the biggest difference between Boethius and Aristotle: the latter conceptualizing rhetoric as a counterpart to dialectic, and the former treating rhetoric and dialectic as entirely separate. I think Aristotle saw both dialectic and rhetoric as inherently epistemological in nature. As I understand it, dialectic reaches towards "revealing" truth through systematic socratic questioning that ends with a truth claim, and rhetoric contends with defending/proving truth, (or "constructing" truth) through a discourse between multiple understandings or perspectives, bridged by agreed upon premises. Both dialectic and rhetoric are methodological in nature, Aristotle claims that they are "faculties" rather than "sciences" (The "Art" of Rhetoric, 41), but the primary distinction that Aristotle makes, which we have discussed quite a bit, is that dialectic deals with subjects that "demand reasoned discussion" while rhetoric contends with discussions/arguments for which there are "no systematic rules" (23). I think Boethius believes this idea delegitimizes rhetoric's place in epistemology for similar reasons that Plato does: a fear that analogizing socially constructed conclusions (or truth statements) with truth "revealed" through connecting "reasoned" premises, as a whole, makes truth democratic (maybe even egalitarian) and amorphous. I think the word "reasoned" is problematic because I think both dialectic and rhetoric are forms of reasoning. Dialectic leads to truth claims, and rhetoric justifies or refutes truth claims.
Plato might be rolling in his grave at this, but I'd argue dialectic, in its ideal form, is constructing truth, not revealing it, through discourse in a similar manner to rhetoric, but by starting with premises and working towards an eventual truth (the syllogism). Rhetoric takes a truth claim to an audience (the enthymeme) and persuades them of it through logos, ethos and pathos. Rhetoric tests truth in a manner that dialectic refuses to. Dialectic doesn't have to contend with the forum, or the collective, in the same way, and therefore it isn't necessarily subject to things like ethos and pathos (although, in reality, I think it is), which makes it "purely" logical and ironically objective. I think Boethius, as Plato does, fails to recognize the epistemological value of bringing a truth claim to a collective. That said, like Aristotle, Boethius is aware of rhetoric's practical value, which is why, I assume, he chose to translate Aristotle's works on rhetoric into latin. I'd argue, ultimately, Boethius views rhetoric's value from the purview of a pragmatist: being that its value lies in it usefulness as an art and practice.
Christine de Pizan: An Advocate for Women's Education
Christine de Pizan was really enjoyable to read because it was a nice step away from the abstraction many of the rhetoricians we have read thus far seem so fond of. Pizan's primary concern was very practical, and her rhetorical maneuvering incredibly nuanced in a lot of ways. I think she, more than anybody else we have read thus far, exemplifies rhetorical principles in her work. While she doesn't speak of these principles directly, she is clearly aware of audience, she builds her ethos through reverence and reference to classical works, and she appeals to logic in claiming that an educated woman could be far more useful than an uneducated one. Her ability to construct an ethos suitable to her audience, in particular, seems incredibly nuanced when you consider she was writing in the middle ages. It was interesting to see, comparing her characterization of herself and the characterization of "Rhetorica" how she, and rhetoric's characterization, subtly transcended the strong cultural binary set between male and female. I also think there is an interesting correlation between the way in which she advocated for women then, and the way in which woman advocate for each other today (besides Pizan's adherence to the role of the woman as submissive to man). What I mean, and I am thinking of this within the context of the Bill Cosby trail and Trump allegations, is the way in which victim-blaming rhetoric is (hopefully) being contended with through ideas like sisterhood. Pizan's arguments against slander could definitely be thought of, in this context, as proto-feminism. With all of this in mind, I think Pizan is an incredibly unique, intriguing, and important figure in the rhetorical canon, despite some of work's unavoidable flaws, like appealing to male dominance, so I'm glad we got the chance to read some of her work, and I am looking forward to reading works from other female rhetoricians.
Friedrich Nietzsche: Language as Metaphor, and Persuasion
"Half of what I say is meaningless; but I say it so that the other half may reach you"
Khalil Gibran, Sand and Foam
(our Nietzsche discussion reminded me of this quote)
Nietzsche is always interesting and headache inducing. I'd argue Nietzsche's sense of language as metaphor makes sense, at the very least, on a semantic level. Metaphor, as I understand it at its most basic level, is claiming that two separate things are one in the same with the intention of revealing some shared meaning. To use an example I oddly remember from childhood, if I were to say my pillow is a cloud I'd be revealing their shared softness. Metaphor is comparative, but it also, often illogically, asserts that two things are in fact one: my pillow isn't actually that cloud. Language gives things and concepts signs, in the form of a sound or/and image, and the two, to some extent, become one in the same. Nevertheless, the sign and thing or concept are not actually one in the same; the word tree, spoken or written, isn't actually the thing being described, but a tool by which the observer of said thing, the tree, can associate and contextualize meaning (I apologize for attempting to break this all down; I am doing so more for myself than anybody else).
Language is inherently metaphorical because in using it we unknowingly assert that an object is the sound or image we have labeled it with, a label that is rich with connotative and cultural meaning, and in doing so we haven't described the thing itself but a conceptualization of the thing. That said, I'd argue that the relationship between a sign and the thing being described is discursive, and therefore also interacting with experience and sensual perception. The meaning of the word tree is created and compounded by our continued experiences with trees, the externally existing beings, and therefore, I'd argue, that language can be understood as both a retainer and creator of meaning, and that this meaning, maybe not all of it, but certainly some of it, is interacting with "objective" truth. So, if truth is created culturally, language is a beautiful manifestation and facilitator of that, and, if there is external truth which we interact with, language beautifully retains or collects this truth and integrates it within the framework through which we conceptually construct abstract and large "t" truth. Therefore, my thesis would be yes, language is metaphorical, but, by the same means it can be said to obscure truth, it is also capable of retaining and/or creating truth (whatever truth looks like)...
Oh, also, I wanted to get into how the use of language is inherently persuasive because we are trying to persuade people to perceive the world in the same manner we do, but my brain hurts, and smarter people, who are more articulate then I am, have made similar claims, so I'll leave it to them for now. Maybe next time. Thank you for reading!
Works Cited
Aristotle. The "Art" of Rhetoric. Translated by John Henry. Freese, Harvard University Press.
Gibran, Khalil. Sand and Foam.
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